Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

State of Utah v. Isiah Bo'Cage Vos : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Laura B. Dupaix; Office of the Utah Attorney General; Attorneys for Appellee.
John Pace; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Vos, No. 20050613 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5898

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20050613-CA
ISIAH BO'CAGE VOS,
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

An appeal from a final judgment and conviction for Criminal Homicide, Murder,
a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2003),
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. The defendant is incarcerated.

John Pace (5624)
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
Mark L.Shurtleff (4666)
Laura B. Dupaix (5195)
Office of the Utah Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
11
160 East 300 South, 6-th
Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Appellee

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

OCT 2 7 2006

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20050613-CA
ISIAH BO'CAGE VOS,

:

Defendant/Appellant

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

An appeal from a final judgment and conviction for Criminal Homicide, Murder,
a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2003),
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. The defendant is incarcerated.

John Pace (5624)
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
Mark L.Shurtleff (4666)
LauraB.Dupaix(5195)
Office of the Utah Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Appellee

T

E OF CONTENTS
Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
, ARGUMENT

11

'

'

'1

MIRANDA WARNINGS ARE ALWAYS REOUIRED

1

A. Dickerson Effectively Requires that Warnings Be Given Even when
Counsel Is Present
,
.

2

1. Warnings and Subsequent Waivers ...
2 /I ffi and a

4

3, 18U.S.CS3501..

. .

4 Dickerson

'

5. Dickerson Applied
B.

Legal Authority Does Not Support the State's Argument

l

^ Authority

R
AJ

1. Utah's Attempt to Distinguish
^

/

15
u

',

CONCLUSION

18
19

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Bourjailyv. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)

12

Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973)

12

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9,10, 11, 12,14,15,18,19

Glasserv. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942)

12

Harris v. New York [401 U.S. 222 (1971)

18

Kastigarv. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1973)

13

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10,
11,12, 14, 15,16,17,18,19

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140

12

Smith v. State, 832 So.2d 92 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001)

19

State v. DeWeese, 582 S.E.2d 786 (W.Va. 2003).....

15, 16, 17, 18

State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988)
State v. Joseph, 128 P.3d 795 (Haw.), reh'g denied 128 P.3d 891 (2006)

4
15, 17, 18

State v. Nelson, 748 P.2d 365 (Haw. 1987)

17

State v. Russo, 681 P.2d 553 (Haw. 1984)

18

State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657 (Haw. 1971)

17

State v. Southland Corp., 684 F.Supp. 292 (S.D. Fla. 1988)

13

State v. Stein, 360 A.2d 347 (NJ. 1976)

12

State v. Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

.4

State v. Valera, 848 P.2d 376 (Haw. 1993)

17

State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440 (Utah 1986)

3
ii

Page
United States v. Schmidt, 816 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987)

13

Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1990)

3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14
Constitutional Provisions

Criminal Procedure Rights under the Hawai'i Constitution Since 1992,
18 U. Haw. L. Rev., 683, 691-97 (1996)
Hawai'i Const, art. I § 10

18
17, 18

U.S. Const, amend. V

9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17

U.S. Const, amend. VI

12

Hi

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20050613-CA
ISIAHBO'CAGEVOS,
Defendant/Appellant

':•

ARGUMENT
This court should not adopt a per se rule that Miranda warnings are never
necessary when an attorney is present at an accused's custodial interrogation.
MIRANDA WARNINGS ARE ALWAYS REQUIRED.
The state urges this court to adopt a per se rule that the warnings required by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) need not be given when an accused is
represented by counsel during custodial interrogation. Any such rule would violate
precedent established by Miranda, and reaffirmed by Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000). The state, in effect, urges this court to adopt a totality of the
circumstances test focusing on voluntariness as the key to a statement's admissibility
when Miranda warnings are not given. In Dickerson, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
precisely this approach. Infra, § A. Section B addresses the authority offered by the state
as support for this drastic departure from established precedent.

First, however, the state's concessions are significant. The state does not contest
that the statement at issue was given in the course of custodial interrogation. Regarding
the trial court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law (R. 115), the state does not
contest that the following factual findings are clearly erroneous: «f 5 (finding that Mr.
Vos was read Miranda warnings when he was arrested); and \ 14 (finding that Mr. Vos's
attorney "ensured that Vos' Miranda rights were waived"). R. 116, 117. Nor does the
state contest that the so-called findings set forth in ^[ 10, 12 and 13 are, in fact,
conclusions of law; and that these conclusions effectively mimic the conclusions set forth
inffif1 and 2 of the actual conclusions. R. 117, 118.1
These concessions greatly simplify the two legal issues addressed herein. Does an
attorney's presence automatically render voluntary, and thus admissible, an un-warned
statement? May the actual warnings themselves be waived by the attorney, and lead to a
valid waiver of those unwarned rights?
A.

Dickerson Effectively Requires that Warnings Be Given Even when Counsel
Is Present
The Supreme Court, in Dickerson, invalidated congressional legislation that

sought to base the admissibility of a self-incriminating statement not upon whether
warnings were given and rights were waived, but rather upon the totality of
circumstances relating to the voluntariness of said confession. 530 U.S. at 431-32. Yet
this totality of the circumstances analysis is what Utah asks this court to adopt.
1

The state suggests that Mr. Vos failed to marshal the evidence in his argument that fact
paragraph 11 (finding that giving the statement was part of a "cogent and joint strategy")
is clearly erroneous. In fact, Mr. Vos's brief, at 8-9, details Mr. Vos's pre-statement
interactions with his attorney, and thus any so-called strategizing that may have occurred.
2

To appreciate the relevance of Dickerson to the case on review, the following must
be understood: The distinction between the self-incrimination warning requirement and
any subsequent waiver of right; the reasoning and holding of Miranda; the statute (18
U.S.C. § 3501 (1990)) at issue in Dickerson; and, Dickerson itself. Infra, §§ 1-4.
Against this backdrop, § 5 addresses the state's argument that a totality of the
circumstances test may suffice in the absence of Miranda warnings.
I Warnings and Subsequent Waivers. The state argues that any statement
made in counsel's presence is voluntary and thus admissible. This argument ignores the
two-prong admissibility requirement that (a) a defendant must be informed about his right
against self-incrimination, and (b) any subsequent waiver of this right be voluntary,
knowing and intelligent.
A confession is admissible only if the defendant received the four warnings
identifying the rights to counsel and against self-incrimination, and only then if any
subsequent waiver of rights is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Miranda, 384 U.S.
479 ("But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution
at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him").
Regarding the waiver, the prosecution "bears a heavy burden to establish not only that
defendant understood his constitutional rights, but that he voluntarily elected to waive
them." State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1986). Significantly, "'the defendant is
given the benefit of every reasonable presumption against such a waiver.'" State v.

2

While Mr. Vos's opening brief, at 42-48, discusses Dickerson, the state's response does
not once mention Dickerson.
3

Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d
1208, 1211 (Utah 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988)).3 Any argument that
ignores the distinction between warnings and waiver fails as a matter of law.
2. Miranda. Reviewing three key holdings from Miranda is important to both
understand the significance of Dickerson, and evaluate the validity of the state's totalityof-circumstances argument.
a. In Miranda, the Court found that compulsion to incriminate oneself is inherent
during custodial interrogation. E.g., 384 U.S. at 457 n.26 (observing the "absurdity of
denying that a confession obtained under these circumstances is compelled"), 467 (noting
that custodial interrogation inflicts "inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely"). The Court rejects the state's argument herein that the Miranda
warnings are something less than mandatory in the apparent absence of coercion:
Because custodial police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and
pressures the individual, we stated that "[e]ven without employing brutality,
the 'third degree' or [other] specific stratagems,. . . custodial interrogation
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of
individuals."
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435 (alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455).4

3

Voluntariness is only one of the three components of a valid, post-warning, waiver of
rights. Such a waiver must also be knowingly and intelligently given. All three
components are addressed in Mr. Vos's opening brief, at pp. 42-46.
4
The state mistakenly asserts that a process that minimizes overt coercion assures
voluntariness, and thus does away with the need for the Miranda warnings. Br. Appellee,
at 37-38. This is precisely what was argued to the Court in Dickerson - and squarely
rejected. For example, then-Professor Paul Cassel, appointed amicus by the Dickerson
Court because neither party would defend the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501,
4

b. The Miranda Court held that all four warnings must be given; it did not suggest
that observing one of the rights embodied by the four warnings might suffice for failing
to warn about the other three. 384 U.S. at 444 (forbidding use of statements rendered
during custodial interrogation unless the accused is "warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney.. . ."), 478-79 (requiring the provision of all
four warnings); accord Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442 (rejecting any sort of totality of the
circumstances test, in lieu of the specific warnings, to determine voluntariness) (citing
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 467, 490-91). In particular, the warning that anything the
accused says can be used at trial is one of the "absolute prerequisite^] to interrogation.'5
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471.
c. The Miranda Court hypothesized that systematic procedures established
through legislation might provide enough protection against compelled confessions that
the warnings would no longer be mandatory.
The Court summarized its holdings at the beginning of the opinion, noting that
they would be "spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow. . .." Id., 384
argued that voluntariness, and thus admissibility, should hinge upon actual coercion, not
upon whether the warnings were given. Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Urging
Affirmance of the Judgment Below (Mar. 9, 2000) at 13 (arguing that § 3501 represents
congressional intent that the trial court decide voluntariness based upon factors in
addition to whether warnings were given), 29 (Fifth Amendment prohibits police from
"forcing," not "causing" a statement; and divining the difference turns upon more than
merely whether warnings were given); 40 ("Irrebuttable presumption" that unwarned
statements are involuntary should be abolished), 41-42 (no reason to believe unwarned
statements are involuntary). Compare Dicker son, 530 U.S. at 435 (quoting Miranda,
384 U.S. at 455, and affirming its conclusion that custodial interrogation is inherently
coercive even without evidence of overreaching).
5

U.S. at 444. In arguing that the fortuitous presence of counsel constitutes an effective
alternative to the giving of all four warnings and a subsequent waiver of rights, the state
quotes a portion of the introductory paragraph in which the Court holds the prosecution
must provide the warnings "unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. The Court later states
that any such alternative must include actual "procedural safeguards," id., developed by
Congress and the states - not happenstance. Id. at 467 ("We encourage Congress and the
States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual. . . ."), 490 ("Congress and the States are free to develop their own
safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective.. . ."). The Court
further clarified that Miranda's invitation to develop alternatives requires actual
legislative action, noting "[The] Miranda Court's invitation for legislative action to
protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination." Dickerson, 530 U.S.
at 440 (emphasis added); see also id. ("the Constitution would not preclude legislative
solutions that differed from the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were cat least as
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence. . . .'" (quoting Miranda,
384 U.S. at 467)).
Moreover, the Miranda Court repeatedly emphasized that any such alternative
guarantee the accused at least as much protection against self-incrimination as the four
warnings provide. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ("other fully effective means"), 467 ("at
least as effective"), 476 ("fully effective equivalent"), 479 ("other fully effective
means"), 490 (alternatives must be "fully as effective as those described above").

3, 18 U.S.C. § 3501. This discussion of § 3501 is relevant to understanding
Dickerson's rejection of the totality-of-circumstances test the state urges this court to
adopt. Section 3501 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the
District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall
be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is
received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury,
determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the
confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the
trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of
voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the
confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession,
including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the
defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before
arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with
which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making
the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that
he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement
could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been
advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5)
whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when
questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken
into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of
voluntariness of the confession.

18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1990) (emphasis added).
Thus § 3501 decreed that a voluntary statement was admissible, and authorized a
totality-of-circumstances analysis to determine voluntariness. It identified receipt of the
Miranda warnings - as well as the assistance of counsel - as possible indications of

7

voluntariness. However, § 3501 abolished the warnings, and a voluntary, knowing and
intelligent waiver of self-incrimination, as absolute prerequisites to admissibility.
Section 3501(b)(5) (emphasized above) pertains to this case because the state
argues that the assistance of counsel ameliorates any requirement for Miranda warnings.
4. Dickerson. In Dickerson, the Court found § 3501 unconstitutional because its
totality-of-circumstances test to determine voluntariness impermissibly eliminated the
requirements that the warnings be given, and a valid waiver of rights obtained, as
conditions for admissibility. The Dickerson Court held that Miranda was a
"constitutional decision." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. As such, legislation may not
diminish the protections against self-incrimination - specifically the four warnings:
In Miranda . . . we held that certain warnings must be given before a
suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted in
evidence. In the wake of that decision, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501,
which in essence laid down a rule that the admissibility of such statements
should turn only on whether or not they were voluntarily made. We hold
that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in
effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda
ourselves. We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court
govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation
in both state and federal courts.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431-32.
This is how the case reached the Supreme Court. The defendant sought to
suppress a confession in the trial court. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999).
While the trial court found the confession voluntarily given, it granted the suppression
motion because the defendant did not receive the Miranda warnings prior to interrogation.
Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 3501 effectively overruled Miranda

8

and, therefore, the trial court's holding as to actual voluntariness compelled admission of
the confession. Id. at 692-93.
In reversing the appeals court, the Supreme Court found that § 3501 based a
statement's admissibility solely upon voluntariness. Id. at 432. Section 3501 posited a
"totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis for determining voluntariness. Id. at 437.
The Court noted that Miranda intended to " 'give concrete constitutional guidelines
for law enforcement agencies to follow.'" Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 439 (emphasis in
original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42). Further emphasizing the mandatory
nature of the Miranda warnings, the Dickerson Court declared: "'The requirement of
warnings and waiver of rights is . .. fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment
privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.'" Id. at
440 n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476).
Precisely because Miranda created a rule of constitutional magnitude, any valid
legislative alternative to the warnings must guarantee as much protection as do the
warnings themselves. Dickerson at 440 ("the Constitution would not preclude legislative
solutions that differed from the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were 'at least as
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence . . . . ' " (quoting Miranda,
384 U.S. at 467)).
Court-invited amicus argued that § 3501 provided as much protection to Fifth
Amendment rights as the Miranda warnings; and, especially when combined with
additional civil remedies now available to challenge police abuse, § 3501 provides even
more protection. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441-42. The Court disagreed, holding:

9

[Section] 3501 explicitly eschews a requirement of preinterrogation
warnings in favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such
warnings as only one factor in determining the voluntariness of a suspect's
confession. The additional remedies cited by amicus do not, in our view,
render them, together with § 3501, an adequate substitute for the warnings
required by Miranda.
Id. at 442. Thus the Court held that even a concededly voluntary statement remains
inadmissible unless the warnings are first given, and the rights voluntarily waived.
5. Dickerson Applied. Both Miranda and Dickerson undermine the state's
argument in favor of a per se rule excusing a failure to provide the Miranda warnings
when the accused is represented by counsel. Five reasons for rejecting the state's
argument are discussed below.
First, the warnings - all four of them - are mandatory absent a legislatively created
systemic alternative that is at least as effective at informing the accused of Fifth
Amendment rights as are the warnings. E.g., Dickerson at 440. At most, Mr. Vos was
apprised of his right to remain silent. R. 259:15-16. He was not warned that anything he
said could be used against him at trial or otherwise. R. 259:34. He was not told that if he
could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed at no expense.5 Because a valid

5

In Miranda, the court acknowledged that the warning about an indigent person's right to
appointed counsel is of little benefit to one who has an attorney, or "is known to have
ample funds." Miranda, 483 U.S. at 473 n.43. The Court, however, declared that
because this warning is so easily given, and the rights involved too important to leave to
haphazard inquiries about financial resources, the warning must be given. Id. & n.43.
Mr. Bucher was retained by Mr. Vos's family. R. 259:20-21. Mr. Vos was a student.
See R. 261:195. Mr. Bucher and Mr. Vos most certainly disagreed about whether Mr.
Vos should give a statement. E.g., R. 259:24 (Mr. Bucher conceding that he had never
discussed in detail what any statement by Mr. Vos might include), 32 (Mr. Vos testifying
that Mr. Bucher had never before discussed making a statement that detailed Mr. Vos's
involvement in the shooting), 33 (Mr. Vos expressing surprise and confusion when
in

waiver is predicated on the warnings being provided and understood (e.g., Miranda, 384
U.S. at 476 (describing "warnings and waiver" as "fundamental," and "not simply a
preliminary ritual"), 479 ("But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
can be used against him")), Mr. Vos simply could not have validly waived rights of which
he was never informed.
Second, the state's argument that an attorney's presence obviates any need for the
warnings embodies nothing more or less than a totality of the circumstances analysis
focusing on voluntariness, which the Dickerson Court soundly rejected. E.g., 530 U.S. at
442-43. The state argues that the presence of an attorney lessens the risk of coercion.
Thus, its argument proceeds, the statement made in an attorney's presence must be
voluntary and, therefore, admissible. However, both the self-incrimination warnings and
a subsequent voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of rights are absolute requisites to
a statement's admissibility. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 479. Absent the warnings,
circumstantial evidence of voluntariness alone will not suffice: "The Fifth Amendment
privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of
giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not
pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without
confronted by Mr. Bucher and the detective), id. (Mr. Vos not wanting to make a
statement), id. (Mr. Vos initially refusing to give a statement), 27 (Mr. Bucher dismissing
Mr. Vos's hesitancy to make a statement as mere naivete), 33 (Mr. Bucher "kept insisting
and kept insisting" that Mr. Vos give a statement). Based upon this conflict, Mr.
Bucher's ineffective assistance (detailed in Mr. Vos's opening brief), and Mr. Vos's
apparent indigence, such a warning would have informed Mr. Vos of a vital - and
relevant - constitutional right.
ll

a warning being given." Id. at 468; see also id. at 469 ("[W]hatever the background of
the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to
overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the
privilege at that point in time"). Even where an attorney is the accused, the warnings are
mandatory. E.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) ("The fact that Glasser
is an attorney is, of course, immaterial to a consideration of his right to the protection of
the Sixth Amendment"), superseded on other grounds by rule as acknowledged in
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987); State v. Stein, 360 A.2d 347, 358
(N.J. 1976) ("Moreover, it goes without saying that the fact that defendant was himself a
lawyer does not derogate from his right of counsel and to complain of unconstitutional
impairment or deprivation of that right").6 Thus Dickerson and Miranda prohibit
consideration of an attorney's presence in determining voluntariness and, thus,
admissibility, when warnings are not given.
Third, absent unusual circumstances, an attorney may not waive self-incrimination
rights on a client's behalf. "By its very nature, the privilege [against self-incrimination] is
an intimate and personal one. It respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and
thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation." Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 n.8 (noting in dicta
that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination "is a purely personal right").
6

By contrast, determining the validity of a waiver given subsequent to the warnings does
permit examination of the totality of the circumstances. E.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476
(noting that circumstances such as the length of interrogation, the accused's ability to
communicate with others, and tactics employed by the prosecution in eliciting the
statement are relevant to whether a post-warning waiver of rights is voluntary).
10

This is why, absent unusual circumstances, an attorney may not validly invoke the right to
remain silent on behalf of a client. "Only the appellants, not their counsel, are the proper
parties to interpose a claim of privilege personal to themselves to prevent compelled
disclosures that appellants 'reasonably believe ( ) could be used (against them) in a
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used."' United
States v. Schmidt, 816 F.2d 1477, 1481 n.3 (10th Cir. 1987) (alteration in original)
(quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1973)); accord State v. Southland
Corp., 684 F.Supp. 292, 294-95 & n.3 (S.D. Fla. 1988). "[Compelling circumstance[s]"
that permit counsel to invoke the right against self-incrimination on behalf of a client
might include the client's "physical incapacity, illness and the like." Id. at 295 nn.4, 5.
If an attorney may not invoke Fifth Amendment rights on behalf of a client,
certainly an attorney may not waive those rights on behalf of a client. After all, the
starting point is that the accused is cloaked with those rights. It is presumed an
incriminating statement disclosed during interrogation is inadmissible unless the
disclosure follows the warnings and a valid waiver. An attorney invoking such rights is
merely reinforcing the status quo. An attorney purporting to waive those rights is
stripping away a client's fundamental constitutional protections. If the former is
impermissible, then so must be the latter.
Mr. Vos did not personally waive any Fifth Amendment right before detailing his
involvement. R. 259:15-16 (the detective who interrogated Mr. Vos testifies that Mr.
Bucher purported to waive Mr. Vos's right to remain silent). No compelling
circumstance prevented the detective from providing all four warnings, and, were he

13

inclined to do so, ensuring that Mr. Vos's waiver was personally, voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently given.
Fourth, § 3501(b)(5) included the assistance of counsel during interrogation among
the nonexclusive list of factors relevant to voluntariness. Even though § 3501 combined
an attorney's involvement with other prophylactic factors within the statute - and beyond
the statute - the Supreme Court held that § 3501 simply did not provide the same level of
protection as do the clear and definite Miranda warnings. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441-42.
Yet, in this case, the state argues that the presence of counsel - and nothing more - is
sufficient protection to render the warnings superfluous. If counsel's involvement and
additional protections are not enough, then neither is the presence of counsel absent any
other protections.
Fifth, the state attempts to qualify the serendipitous presence of counsel as a fully
effective equivalent to the warnings that the Miranda Court invited states and Congress
to create. However, the Court has made clear that any such alternative should be
systemic and legislative in nature. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440 (noting the "Miranda
Court's invitation for legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced
self-incrimination" (emphasis added)). The requirement that any such alternative be
systemic in nature is further evidenced by Miranda's express rejection of a case-by-case
analysis of surrounding circumstances to determine voluntariness: "[W]e will not pause
to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a
warning given." 384 U.S. at 468. That Mr. Vos had an attorney when the detective

appeared to interrogate him does not constitute the systemic, legislative alternative
envisioned by the Miranda Court.
B.

Legal Authority Does Not Support the State's Argument.
Neither the state's attempt to distinguish two on-point cases discussed in Mr.

Vos's opening brief, nor the authority the state offers in support of establishing a per se
rule that effectively overrules Miranda and Dickerson, is persuasive.
1. Utah's Attempt to Distinguish. Mr. Vos's opening brief discusses two cases
that hold the requirement of warnings is absolute, and the accused's personal right to
receive, invoke or waive said right is unaffected by the presence of counsel: State v.
DeWeese, 582 S.E.2d 786 (W.Va. 2003); and State v. Joseph, 128 P.3d 795 (Haw.), reh'g
denied 128 P.3d 891 (2006).
In DeWeese, defense counsel was present with the defendant when it was agreed
the defendant would take a polygraph examination. See id., 582 S.E.2d at 797. There, as
here, counsel told police they need not give his client the Miranda warnings prior to the
examination. Id. The state court of last resort addressed two legal issues in DeWeese that
also apply to this case.
The first legal issue is whether counsel's presence obviates the need for Miranda
warnings. DeWeese, 582 S.E.2d at 795. Mr. Vos's opening brief, pp. 46-47, details the
court's reasoning and ultimate holding: "[W]e hold that prior to giving a polygraph
examination, the police must inform the defendant of his Miranda rights even though
defense counsel is present in the room with the defendant when a polygraph examination
is about to be given." Id. at 797.
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In the case on review, the state attempts to distinguish DeWeese because counsel in
that case was not actually sitting at the defendant's side throughout the entire
interrogation, whereas Mr. Bucher was present when Mr. Vos gave a statement.
However, as noted in the DeWeese holding (quoted immediately above), the critical time
is when the attorney's presence just prior to interrogation leads to the failure to warn
against self-incrimination. The Miranda warnings must be read before interrogation,
regardless of what follows after. That is when fundamental constitutional rights are
observed or ignored, invoked or waived. Thus, in both DeWeese and this case, the critical
point was when counsel and police were discussing the defendant's imminent
interrogation. In both DeWeese and in this case, counsel and client were side-by-side at
this critical juncture. In neither was the attorney's subsequent presence relevant.7
The second legal issue addressed in DeWeese is whether, when counsel
purportedly waives the actual reading of the Miranda warnings on a defendant's behalf, a
valid waiver of rights may occur thereafter. 582 S.E.2d at 796. In DeWeese, just prior to
the interrogation, "[d]efense counsel indicated the warnings did not have to be given." Id.
The DeWeese court reasoned that the Miranda warnings are mandatory even when
counsel is present, and absent said warnings, Miranda bars consideration of
circumstantial evidence to establish a defendant's understanding of the rights against self7

Moreover, the DeWeese court framed the legal issue in terms more broadly applicable to
a variety of situations - as appellate courts are wont to do. Thus the opinion's section
heading frames the issue as follows: "Presence of counsel during polygraph
interrogation." 582 S.E.2d at 795. Its preliminary holding similarly assumes counsel's
presence: "Likewise, Miranda does not stand for the proposition that a warning
regarding the privilege against self-incrimination is not required when counsel is present
at an interrogation." Id. (emphasis in original).

incrimination. DeWeese, 582 S.E.2d at 796-97. As a result, the court held that "while a
defendant may waive the rights articulated under the Miranda warnings, a defendant
cannot, as a matter of law, waive the reading of the Miranda rights." Id. at 797.
As with the first holding, this one applies to the case on review. Counsel's
presence after counsel has waived the actual reading of the warnings is irrelevant to the
holding that, in effect, a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of rights cannot occur
following counsel's purported waiver of the reading of the warnings. Put simply, a valid
waiver may not, as a matter of law, occur unless the warnings are first given.
The state attempts to avoid the holding of the second on-point opinion, State v.
Joseph, by claiming it was decided on state constitutional grounds, not federal. The court
in Joseph held, "The presence of an attorney does not constitute an implied waiver of the
right to remain silent," and, therefore, "the police had an obligation to advise [the
defendant] that he had the right to remain silent." 128 P.3d at 811. The Joseph court did
indeed rely upon the Hawai'i constitution, art. I § 10; and, the Hawai'i court has
interpreted § 10 more broadly than its federal Fifth Amendment counterpart. State v.
Nelson, 748 P.2d 365, 369 (Haw. 1987). However, this expansion has occurred in very
narrow and well-defined circumstances. For example, whereas federal post-Miranda
precedent allows statements extracted in violation of Miranda to be used to impeach a
defendant's testimony, the Hawai'i constitution mandates that the statement remain
inadmissible. State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 662 (Haw. 1971). Santiago was extended
to exclude un-Mirandized statements from sentencing proceedings in State v. Valera, 848
P.2d 376, 382 (Haw. 1993). In Criminal Procedure Rights under the Hawai'i
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Constitution Since 1992, 18 U. Haw. L. Rev., 683, 691-97 (1996), such deviations from
federal self-incrimination precedent are noted, and none relate in any way to the holding
in Joseph that requires Miranda warnings even in the presence of counsel.
Absent such recognized deviations, the rule in Hawai'i is to follow the "seminal"
decision of Miranda: "[W]hen claims of Miranda violations are advanced, we are
constrained to seek primary guidance from precepts enunciated in the seminal decision,
which have been incorporated into Article I, § 7 [since redesignated as § 10] of our
constitution, and our cases rather than from later federal decisions like Harris v. New
York [401 U.S. 222 (1971) (admitting un-Mirandized statements to impeach defendant's
testimony)]." State v. Russo, 681 P.2d 553, 559 (Haw. 1984).
Not surprising, therefore, the portion of Joseph relevant to the case on review cites
Miranda, and quotes from it at length, no fewer than three times. Joseph, 128 P.3d at
810-11. It cites and quotes from DeWeese, supra. Joseph at 810. It cites two other U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, and one from a California state court. Id. at 811. Not once
does it rely on a case from, or a non-federal precedent established by, a Hawai'i court or
compelled by the Hawai'i constitution. The Joseph holding provides persuasive
interpretation of federal law, not state law.
2. Utah's Authority. Utah's authority cannot withstand Dickerson *s affirmation
of the mandatory nature of the Miranda warnings, and its rejection of a totality of
circumstances analysis from which voluntariness might be divined. Supra, § A.
Significantly, only one of the published opinions offered by the state issued after
the 2000 issuance of Dickerson. That was Smith v. State, 832 So.2d 92 (Ala.Crim.App.
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2001). There, the court found circumstances such as the presence of counsel, and the
defendant's initial exercise of the right to call a lawyer before speaking to police, to be
indicative of voluntariness, and thus "a fully effective equivalent" to the warnings. Id. at
98 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (emphasis removed)).
The Smith opinion, however, mentions neither Dickerson, nor its definitive
rejection of a totality of circumstances analysis focused upon voluntariness. Also not
mentioned was Miranda's prohibition of relying upon circumstantial evidence in lieu of
the warnings to establish voluntariness. E.g., 384 U.S. at 468-69. The Miranda and
Dickerson invitation for systemic legislative alternatives to the mandatory warnings was
not mentioned. E.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440 ("the Constitution would not preclude
legislative solutions that differed from the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were
'at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence. .. .'" (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467)).
The state court erred in deciding Smith. Other decisions that rely upon
circumstances such as the presence of counsel to forgive the failure to give the warnings
are similarly flawed, and have been effectively overruled by Dickerson,
CONCLUSION
Counsel provided ineffective assistance leading up to the custodial interrogation.
The statement made during the interrogation was taken in violation of rights against selfincrimination. The statement was used to great effect by the prosecution at trial. Its
admission greatly restricted the defendant's strategic options. The trial court erred when

10

it denied Mr. Vos's motion to suppress the statement. The conviction should be reversed,
and a new trial granted at which the statement may not be used to incriminate Mr. Vos.
DATED this 27th day of October, 2006.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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INTRODUCTION

Aris's own employees testified without contradiction or dispute that Aris ceased all
business operations on January 4, 2002, fired all of its employees, closed its doors and
then on January 7, 2002, turned over possession of the Premises to the independent
contractor doctors to run their own business on the Premises. Aris never again sought to
occupy the Premises and, of course, had no reason to do so. Aris simply wanted to
remove its equipment from the Premises. In fact, when Aris's Richard Enright
("Enright") came to Salt Lake City on January 22, 2002 to remove Aris's personal
property, the Doctors were still operating their business on the Premises and continued to
do so for a few weeks thereafter. Aris never contended that it suffered damages because
of its inability to occupy the Premises and no such damages were awarded. Instead, the
only damages sought and awarded were for depreciation of the personal property,
physical damage to the personal property and missing personal property. It is respectfully
submitted that the court of appeals erred in affirming the award of treble damages for this
personal property damage.

IL
ARGUMENT

A. WASATCH AND JDJ HAVE MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE AND
PROPERLY PRESERVED BELOW THEIR ARGUMENT CONCERNING
VACATING OF THE PREMISES,
Aris repeats in its brief the unsuccessful arguments it made to the court of appeals
that Wasatch and JDJ have failed to marshal the evidence and to preserve below their
argument concerning Aris's vacating of the Premises.1 The record, however,
demonstrates that Wasatch and JDJ have indeed marshaled the evidence and did preserve
their argument below.

1. Wasatch and JDJ Marshaled the Evidence.
As it did before the court of appeals. Aris incorrectly argues that Wasatch and JDJ
have failed to marshal the evidence. Aris wholly fails, however, to recite a single piece of
evidence that was supposedly not marshaled or dispute with citations to the record any of
the evidence recited in Petitioners' Brief. This failure is not surprising because all of the
evidence recited in Petitioners' Brief comes from the testimony of Aris's own witnesses

1

Ironically, as discussed later in this brief [pp. 8-10], Aris also raises for the very first
time an argument not raised before the court of appeals, i.e., that Wasatch and JDJ failed to raise
before the court of appeals or the trial court their contention that treble damages cannot be
awarded for damage to personal property.
2

upon which Aris relied at trial or upon the stipulation of facts executed by the parties.
[See R. 210-216] Indeed, all of the facts which Aris sets forth in its brief are contained in
Petitioners' Brief, but are stated in Petitioner's Brief in even more detail most favorably
to Aris.
For example, Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ have failed to marshal the
evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Aris did not vacate the Premises prior to
January 22, 2002. Aris has been unable, however, to point to one piece of evidence not
contained in Petitioners' Brief. As stated above, Aris's own witnesses, Enright and his
boss, Kathleen Soto ("Soto"), testified without contradiction that Aris ceased all business
operations and terminated all its employees on January 4, did not pay rent and then turned
over possession to the independent contractor Doctors to operate their own business on
January 7. [R. 526 at 38-39; 527 at 234-237] Enright further testified that when he came
to Salt Lake City on January 22, he wanted to remove the equipment from the Premises.
[R. 526 at 41-43] Aris did not demand that the Doctors who were then in possession of
the Premises vacate the Premises and Aris made no effort to reoccupy the Premises. Soto
likewise testified that she told Wasatch's Dennis Peacock ("Peacock") that Aris was
entitled to remove its equipment before surrendering the Premises. [R. 527 at 246-248]
The failure to marshal argument raised by Aris is bereft of merit and should be
rejected.

"»

J

2. Wasatch and JDJ Preserved Below Their Argument That Aris Vacated on
January 4, 2002.
Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ failed to preserve at trial the argument that Aris
vacated on January 4, 2002 and then misleadingly cites two alternative arguments raised
by Wasatch and JDJ below with respect to vacating of the Premises. Once again, this
argument is not faithful to the record. Wasatch and JDJ repeatedly argued before the trial
court that Aris either vacated the Premises on January 4 or at least by February 9 when the
Doctors vacated. For example:
(a) Wasatch and JDJ contended in the Pretrial Order that Aris unilaterally
terminated the Lease on January 4 and had vacated the Premises more than five days prior
to January 22, 2002, which was the date on which Aris contended the forcible detainer
occurred. [R. 169-170 & 176]
(b) Wasatch and JDJ argued in their Trial Brief that Aris shut down its office and
terminated all of its employees on January 4, allowed the Doctors to take possession of
the Premises and failed to pay the January rent. [R. 219] Wasatch and JDJ argued that
Aris's own testimony demonstrated that the Doctors - - not Aris - - were in possession of
the Premises on January 22, 2002 and that since Aris had terminated all its employees on
January 4, Aris was not in possession after that date. [R. 239-231]
(c) In their closing arguments at trial, Wasatch and JDJ again argued that Aris
vacated the Premises on January 4 when it terminated its employees and closed its offices:
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"The evidence at trial revealed that January 4, 2002 was the last day Aris was in
peaceable possession of the premises . . . . Aris was not in peaceable possession on that
date [January 22, 2002] - the terminated doctors were in possession at that time." [R. 305]
[See also R. 529 at 558-559 & 577]
Indeed, in his opening statement, Aris's own counsel told Judge Lewis that Aris
shut down its business on the Premises on January 4, 2002 and that thereafter the
independent contractor Doctors conducted their own business on the Premises. [R. 526 at
19-20]2 Beyond that, the Statement of Stipulated Facts executed by the parties prior to
trial indicates the same thing. [R. 212-213,lfl[17-20]
In fact, the uncontradicted testimony of Aris's own witnesses at trial was that when
Enright attempted to remove the equipment on January 22, Wasatch's Peacock refused on
the basis that Aris had abandoned the Premises. [R. 526 at 44-45; R. 415, Finding No.
27]
Clearly, Wasatch and JDJ raised at trial their argument that Aris vacated the
Premises on January 4.

2

If Aris is attempting to argue that Aris did not vacate because the Doctors' occupancy
constituted occupancy by Aris, this argument does not assist its case. If such a legally baseless
argument were accepted, Aris necessarily continued in occupancy of the Premises on January 22
when Enright attempted to remove the personal property because at that time the Doctors were
undeniably still in possession of the Premises using the equipment [see Finding of Fact No. 90].
Thus, there could not have been a forcible detainer of real estate on January 22 when Wasatch
and JDJ refused to consent to Enright's removing the personal property, as found by the trial
court and affirmed by the court of appeals.
5

3. Whether Aris Vacated the Premises on January 4 Is Properly Before This
Court.
Aris narrowly construes this Court's order granting certiorari to preclude the
argument raised by Wasatch and JDJ that treble damages cannot be awarded because Aris
had already vacated the Premises weeks before Wasatch and JDJ refused to allow Aris to
remove its personal property. The Order states that the issue to be determined is:
"Whether damages awarded for loss, damage, and depreciation to personal property may
be trebled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10(3)." The determination of that issue
obviously has to be made based upon the facts of this particular case. Wasatch and JDJ
have argued that treble damages cannot be awarded for damage to personal property in
any circumstance but that at the very least treble damages cannot be awarded for personal
property where, as in the present case, the tenant vacated the Premises weeks before the
tenant was not allowed to remove the personal property. This issue is properly before the
Court.

B. TREBLE DAMAGES FOR CONVERSION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
ARE NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER THE FORCIBLE DETAINER STATUTE,

1. Wasatch and JDJ Preserved This Argument Below.
Aris argues for the very first time that Wasatch and JDJ failed to raise before the
court of appeals or the trial court the contention that treble damages under the forcible
6

detainer statute cannot be awarded for damage to personal property. Aris made no such
argument before the court of appeals and this Court should, therefore, refuse to consider
the argument. See, Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101,1J30, 16 P.3d 1233. Moreover, the
record disposes of this argument.
First, Wasatch and JDJ clearly raised this argument before the court of appeals
both in their opening brief and their reply brief. [See Appellants' Brief at 35-36;
Appellants' Reply Brief at 9, excerpts of which are attached hereto as Addenda A&B] For
example, Wasatch and JDJ argued in their opening brief before the court of appeals:
Aris did not seek restitution of the Premises at trial and no such relief was
granted. Aris did not even seek any damages on the basis it had not been
able to occupy and use the Premises for the obvious reason that Aris had no
use for the Premises. Aris only sought damages it claimed to have suffered
because it had not been permitted to take its Equipment from the Premises.
The treble damages penalty provided by the forcible detainer statute
is a drastic remedy to discourage landlords from forcibly dispossessing
tenants of their possession of real property. The statute should be strictly
construed. [Citations omitted] A landlord's act in withholding a tenant's
personal property is distinct from the act of forcibly detaining real property
a tenant is occupying. A tenant is relegated to an action for conversion and
replevin with respect to personal property. The forcible detainer statute
simply does not apply to a landlord's claimed wrongful withholding of
personal property, especially after a tenant has vacated and abandoned the
premises. The imposition of the treble damages penalty would be even
more incongruous in the case at bar where the parties cooperated for months
in attempting to find a replacement tenant and Aris had no desire or ability
to occupy the Premises. [Appellants' Brief at 35-36]
In addition, in Appellants' Reply Brief before the court of appeals, Wasatch and
JDJ argued:
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Wasatch and JDJ did not unlawfully hold and keep the Premises, or do so
by force. At most, Aris only wanted to remove its Equipment. The forcible
detainer statute applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not to the
withholding of personal property. [Citations omitted]
Wasatch and JDJ then went on in their reply brief to distinguish the two cases that Aris
cited in its brief before the court of appeals to attempt to support the imposition of treble
damages. [Appellants' Reply Brief at 9]
Clearly, the treble damage issue was raised by Wasatch and JDJ before the court of
appeals.
Aris also raises for the first time its argument that the treble damage argument was
not preserved in the trial court. Even if Aris could raise this new argument, Wasatch and
JDJ clearly did preserve the treble damages issue before the trial court. [See, e.g., R. 401402, Ifflc and e;R. 403,^5]
For example, in its objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment, Wasatch and JDJ argued that §78-36-10 only applied to the forcible
detainer of real property, not personal property. [R. 401, ^Jc] They further argued that
"[s]ince the elements of the forcible detainer statute were not met the trebling of damages
is not appropriate . . . . Only the damages set forth in §78-36-10(2)(a) are eligible for
trebling, which does not include personal property or equipment. [R. 401-402, ^fe] [See
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also R. 403, ^J5; R. 304 (the facts of the case do not qualify as a forcible detainer action
and treble damages are not appropriate.)] 3
An issue is adequately preserved for appellate review if it is raised in time to give
the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue. Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App. 367,
U17, 38 P.3d 307. In James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987), the court
stated that "[a] matter is sufficiently raised if it has been submitted to the trial court and
the trial court has had the opportunity to make findings of fact or law." In Peirce v.
Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ^[16, 994 P.2d 193, this Court held that the appellant adequately
preserved issues in the trial court by raising them in a memorandum submitted to the trial
court before it issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the case at bar,
Wasatch and JDJ plainly raise the issue of treble damages with respect to personal
property before the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, the
issue was preserved for appeal.

3

In this connection, it should be noted that Aris's contention that it was entitled to
recover treble damages with respect to the personal property damage was not raised until late in
the game. In its Amended Complaint, Aris only claimed generally that it had "suffered damages,
and continues to suffer damages" as a result of the forcible detainer of the Premises and then
sought treble damages with respect to those unspecified damages. [R. 33,1H[29 & 30] Aris did
not allege personal property damage by virtue of the forcible detainer. The only personal
property damage alleged was in the Fourth Claim for Relief for conversion. [R. 34, TflJ37 thru 39]
Aris did not seek treble damages with respect to the personal property damages alleged in its
conversion claim. Nor in its trial brief did Aris expressly contend that it was entitled to treble
damages for damage to personal property based on violation of the forcible detainer statute. [R.
199-200] Instead, Aris argued that it was entitled to recover the personal property damages based
upon its conversion claim and sought to recover punitive damages. [R. 201-202] It was not until
the last seconds of its counseFs closing argument that Aris claimed briefly in passing and without
discussion or citation of authority that it was entitled to either treble damages or punitive
damages with respect to the personal property damage. [R. 529 at 556]
9

2. §78-36-10(2) and (3) Do Not Provide for Trebling of Personal Property
Damage.
Aris argues that under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10(2),
damages to personal property are recoverable where the landlord has forcibly detained the
real estate and, therefore, such damages must be trebled under §78-36-10(3). To the
contrary, §78-36-10(2) says nothing about damage to personal property. That section
provides:
The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is
alleged in the Complaint and proved at trial.
Each of these subsections relates to real estate. There is no such thing as the forcible
detainer of personal property. A landlord's refusal to turn over possession of personal
property is a conversion and is a distinct act from the landlord's forcible detainer of the
real estate.
Section 78-36-10(3) only provides that: "The judgment shall be entered against the
defendant for the rent, [and] for three times the amount of damages assessed under
Subsections (2) (a) through (2) (c). . . ." As demonstrated in Petitioners' Brief [p. 20],
this treble damages penalty provision should be strictly construed. Because there is no
express provision in §78-36-10(2) for recovery of personal property damages, §78-36-
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10(3) should be strictly construed to prohibit treble damages for damages to personal
property.
Such a statutory interpretation would not, of course, leave a tenant without a
remedy where a landlord refuses to surrender possession of personal property. The tenant
can recover compensatory damages for conversion and can also recover punitive damages
in an appropriate case where the landlord has acted willfully and maliciously or in
knowing or reckless disregard of a tenant's rights. Utah Code Ann. §78-18-19. In the
case at bar, the trial court refused to award punitive damages because Wasatch and JDJ
did not act with a knowing or reckless indifference or disregard of Aris's rights. [R. 369375] The trial court's refusal to award punitive damages is not surprising given the fact
that JDJ in good faith claimed it had a right to retain the personal property based upon
Aris's claimed abandonment of the Premises and the provisions of paragraph 20.1 of the
Lease [Ex. 9,1J20.1; R. 526 at 41-43; R. 413; Finding No. 26] and the further fact that the
parties were cooperating for months to attempt to lease the Premises and sell the personal
property to a third party. [R. 527 at 164-166 & 199; R. 528 at 470-471 & Ex. 24]

3. The Personal Property Damage Did Not Constitute Consequential
Damages or General Damages Resulting From the Forcible Detainer,
Judge Orme stated in his dissenting opinion that even if the personal property
damages could be viewed as consequential damages from the forcible detainer, the

11

personal property damages could not be recovered because no general damages were
recovered for the forcible detainer. Aris's response is telling.
First, Aris argues that the personal property damages were not consequential
damages resulting from the forcible detainer and that Wasatch and JDJ never made such
an argument. [Aris Brief at 23-24] Wasatch and JDJ agree. Although Judge Orme was
correct that even if the personal property damages were viewed as consequential damages
they could not be recovered, the parties never argued the personal property damages were
consequential damages and they clearly were not. In other words, the personal property
damages were not suffered as a consequence of a forcible detainer of the real estate. The
personal property damages found by the trial court were suffered as a result of the refusal
by Wasatch and JDJ to surrender possession of the personal property to Aris, but, this fact
augers in favor of Wasatch and JDJ.4
Second, Aris argues that it suffered "harm, detriment, or loss sustained by reason
of the injury" resulting from the forcible detainer of the Premises, that the personal
property damages were the natural and proximate cause of the forcible detainer found by

4

Furthermore, Aris has never argued that the personal property damage constituted
special damages resulting from the forcible detainer of the Premises. Even had Aris made such a
contention, and even if the personal property damages were incorrectly deemed to be special
damages, Aris did not plead special damages in the forcible detainer cause of action of its
Amended Complaint. [R. 33] A party is required to specifically plead special damages in order to
recover them. See, Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 162 (Utah 1991); Graham v.
Street, 270 P.2d 456, 459 (Utah 1954).
12

the trial court so that these damages constituted general damages and that is all Aris was
required to prove.
This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between detainer of the real estate
and the separate act of refusing to permit removal of the personal property. As Judge
Orme stated in his dissenting opinion, "[i]t subverts the purpose of that long-standing
policy favoring real estate to treble all damages in an action between a tenant and
landlord just because forcible detainer of the leasehold is one aspect of that litigation."
[Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 2005 UT App. 326,
TJ36, 121 P.3d 24] The natural and proximate result of a landlord's forcible detainer of
real estate is the tenant's loss of occupancy of the real estate. It was not the detainer of
the real estate that caused the damages awarded Aris. It was the separate act of refusing
to turn over the personal property. As stated earlier, Aris suffered no damage because of
any loss of occupancy of the real estate.
Aris argues in this regard that Judge Orme was wrong in stating that the general
damages recoverable by a tenant for forcible detainer of real estate consist of the
reasonable rental value of the Premises during the time they were forcibly detained.
Without any authority, Aris argues that reasonable rental value is not the measure of
damages because a tenant is not entitled to recover rent from the landlord. However, if a
tenant is entitled to possession of real estate, the general measure of damages that a tenant
suffers by being deprived of possession is the value of the possession. In turn, the value
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of the possession of leased premises would (absent proof otherwise) presumably be the
reasonable rental value of the real estate. That amount is what it would cost the tenant to
lease other comparable space. 5 In any event, the general damages recoverable for forcible
detainer of real estate would not be damage to personal property.

4. There Are No Utah Cases Holding That Treble Damages Can Be
Recovered For Conversion of Personal Property.
Aris incorrectly argues that Utah case law supports its position that treble damages
under the forcible detainer statute can be awarded for conversion of personal property.
[Aris Brief at 18-20] The cases cited by Aris do not in fact support this position.
Aris miscites Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985) and
Peterson v. Piatt, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (Utah 1965). These cases are not on point because
they both involved the forcible detainer of real property where the landlord not only
refused to allow the tenant to occupy the premises, but at the same time refused to permit
the tenant to remove personal property. This Court simply recognized that the tenants had
causes of action for conversion of the personal property. The Court did not hold or imply

5

Aris challenges Judge Orme's reliance upon Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206 (Utah 1930)
for his general damage analysis on the basis that it was an unlawful detainer case and argues that
Wasatch and JDJ fail to address the Forrester court's language that tC[t]he plaintiff is entitled to
recover such damages as are the natural and proximate consequences of the unlawful detainer."
Aris's distinction is one without a difference. And, once again, the natural and proximate cause
of an unlawful detainer or a forcible detainer of real estate is not damage to personal property.
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in either case that treble damages can be awarded against a landlord for conversion of the
tenant's personal property.
Aris cites for the first time King v. Firm, 285 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1955). King does
not assist Aris. In King, the landlords padlocked the premises and refused to allow the
tenant to enter to remove its personal property after the tenant had failed to pay rent. The
tenant sued for wrongful eviction andfor conversion ofits personal property. The Court
held that the tenant had failed to prove any damages resulting from the landlords' forcible
entry onto the Premises. No treble damages were awarded and no issue of treble damages
was discussed. In fact, the tenant sought to separately recover on his conversion claim
damages for the landlords' refusal to turn over the tenant's personal property. The Court
separately discussed this issue and held that the landlords had a lien on the personal
property for unpaid rent and therefore had not converted the personal property. Further,
there was no conversion because there was no evidence that the landlords used the
personal property for their own purposes.
Similarly, Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100 (Utah 1944), relied upon by Aris, is
unhelpful. That case did not involve any damage to personal property. While the tenant
was away from the premises in the middle of the winter, the landlord removed all of the
doors. The tenant continued in possession. The Court only concluded that the landlord
had a legal duty not to enter the premises by force, that the landlord had violated that duty
and the tenant had suffered damages. The majority opinion did not even discuss the type
or amount of damages involved. The Court only held the trial court had not erred in
15

awarding damages for mental anguish and humiliation without assessing other nominal or
compensatory damages. There was no discussion as to whether these damages were
special damages, consequential damages or general damages.
Lastly, Aris places great reliance upon Fowler v. Setter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah App.
1992), decided by a panel of the court of appeals of which Judge Orme was a member.
Aris argues that in Fowler the court of appeals "upheld an award of treble damages for
loss of and damage to personal property under the forcible detainer statute." Aris unfairly
and inaccurately criticizes Jude Orme's opinion in the case at bar as being inconsistent
with his decision in Fowler. [Aris Brief at 19-20]
Aris overstates the holding in Fowler. In Fowler, the owners of a self-storage
facility broke the lock on the tenant's unit and removed and sold the tenant's personal
property. The single defendant at trial admitted liability and the jury awarded damages of
$7,000. There is no discussion in the opinion of the basis for the $7,000 award and the
award of compensatory damages was not an issue on appeal. After entry of the verdict,
the plaintiffs moved for an award of treble damages pursuant to the forcible entry and
detainer statute. The only objection raised by the landlord was that the tenant had failed
to endorse the summons pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-8 and that failure allegedly
barred an award of treble damages. The only issue on appeal was whether the failure to
endorse the summons barred an award of treble damages.6 838 P.2d at 677. There was

6

The court of appeals did not even decide the general question of whether the forcible
entry statute applied to an uninhabited storage facility because that issue was not before the court.
[838P.2dat677n.3]
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no issue before the court of appeals as to whether treble damages could be awarded for
damage to personal property (even assuming that the $7,000 verdict was based upon
personal property damages) and the court of appeals did not decide such an issue.
Consequently, Aris's criticism of Judge Orme's opinion in the present case as being
inconsistent with his opinion in Fowler is baseless. Simply put, Fowler did not consider
or decide the issue now before this Court. No Utah case has decided this issue.

C. EVEN IF TREBLE DAMAGES COULD OTHERWISE BE AWARDED
FOR DAMAGE TO PERSONAL PROPERTY IN CONNECTION WITH A
FORCIBLE DETAINER, TREBLE DAMAGES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED
WHERE THE TENANT HAS ALREADY VACATED THE PREMISES.
Even if, contrary to what Wasatch and JDJ argue above and in their opening brief,
this Court concludes for some reason that when a landlord forcibly detains real estate and
then refuses to turn over possession of the tenant's personal property that the personal
property damage can be trebled, treble damages should not have been awarded in this
case.
As previously explained, the undisputed evidence from Aris's own employees - as recited by Aris's counsel in his opening statement and as acknowledged in the
stipulated facts - - was that Aris went out of business, terminated its employees and shut
its doors on January 4, 2002 and then turned over possession of the Premises to the
Doctors to operate their own business on January 7, 2002. Although Aris argues it did
17

not vacate the Premises at that time, it does not challenge this undisputed evidence or
recite any evidence to support the notion that it continued in possession of the Premises.
Aris had no use for the Premises, never attempted to reoccupy the Premises and had no
ability to do so since it had fired all of its employees.
After Aris went out of business on January 4, at most all the evidence
demonstrated was that commencing 18 days later, on January 22, Aris wanted to remove
its equipment. Because Aris did not want to occupy, and could not use, the Premises,
Aris did not suffer any damages because it did not continue to occupy the real estate; Aris
did not seek any occupancy damages and Aris was not awarded any such damages.
Under these circumstances, Aris was not entitled to an award of treble damages for the
conversion of its personal property found by the trial court which occurred weeks after
Aris had vacated the Premises.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the court
of appeals affirming the award of treble damages should be reversed and the Judgment
modified to eliminate the award of treble damages.
DATED this

of February, 2006.

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE
Attorneys for Petitioners
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Sixth, Aris had no right to recover for forcible detainer because it was not seeking
restitution of the Premises. Under Utah Code Ann., §78-36-10(1), a judgment for forcible
detainer "shall include an order for the restitution of the premises as provided in Section
78-36-10.5." [Emphasis Added] See Freeway Park Bldg., 451 P.2d at 275 (the case was
not for forcible entry or detainer because restitution of the premises was not sought, but
was instead for the separate tort of wrongful eviction). Aris did not seek restitution of the
Premises at trial and no such relief was granted. Aris did not even seek any damages on
the basis it had not been able to occupy and use the Premises for the obvious reason that
Aris had no use for the Premises. Aris only sought damages it claimed to have suffered
because it had not been permitted to take its Equipment from the Premises.
The treble damages penalty provided by the forcible detainer statute is a drastic
remedy to discourage landlords from forcibly dispossessing tenants of their possession of
real property. The statute should be strictly construed. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 393 P.2d
468, 470 (Utah 1964). Cf Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102,
108 (Utah 1998) (forcible entry statute only applies to types of property people can
occupy). See also Gibby's Inc. v. Aylett, 615 P.2d 949, 951 (Nev. 1980). A landlord's act
in withholding a tenant's personal property is distinct from the act of forcibly detaining
real property a tenant is occupying. A tenant is relegated to an action for conversion and
replevin with respect to personal property. The forcible detainer statute simply does not
apply to a landlord's claimed wrongful withholding of personal property, especially after
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a tenant has vacated and abandoned the premises. The imposition of the treble damages
penalty would be even more incongruous in the case at bar where the parties cooperated
for months in attempting to find a replacement tenant and Aris had no desire or ability to
occupy the Premises.
Aris argued below, and the trial court found, that in addition to forcibly detaining
the Equipment on January 22, Wasatch and JDJ also forcibly detained the Equipment
when Peacock changed the locks after the Doctors vacated on February 9. However,
Aris had long before voluntarily vacated and abandoned the Premises and wrongfully
turned possession of the Premises over to the Doctors. When the locks were changed on
February 9, Aris had not occupied or operated a business on the Premises for over a
month. Further, Aris did not have keys to the Premises even before the locks were
changed so the changing of the locks did not dispossess Aris and had no effect
whatsoever on Aris's ability to occupy the Premises. Finally, after the locks were
changed, Aris did not request occupancy of the Premises or keys to the Premises. Aris
was given access to the Premises any time it requested for the purpose of inspecting and
inventorying the Equipment and showing it to prospective purchasers. [SOF Nos. 29 &
35]
2. Wrongful Eviction,
Similarly, because Aris had vacated and abandoned the Premises on January 4 and
then turned over possession of the Premises to the Doctors, thereby breaching the Lease,
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1. Forcible Detainer.
After Aris ceased all business operations, terminated all employees and vacated the
Premises on January 4 and voluntarily turned over possession of the Premises to the
doctors on January 1, Aris had no reason or desire to occupy the Premises and had no
ability to do so.

Wasatch and JDJ did not unlawfully hold and keep the Premises, or do

so by force. At most, Aris only wanted to remove its Equipment. The forcible detainer
statute applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not to the withholding of personal
property. 4 Utah Code Ann., §78-36-2. See Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States
Wholesale Supply, 451 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1969).
Aris miscites Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985) and
Peterson v. Piatt, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (Utah 1965), for the proposition that a landlord can
be held liable under the forcible detainer statute for seizing a tenant's personal property
without judicial process. [Appellee's Brief at 31 ] These cases are not on point because
they both involved the forcible detainer of real property where the landlord also refused to
permit the tenant to remove personal property. Further, the Supreme Court only
recognized that the tenants had causes of action for conversion of the personal property.
The Supreme Court did not hold or intimate in either case that treble damages can be
awarded against a landlord for conversion of the tenant's personal property.

4

Aris does not appear to challenge that Wasatch and JDJ raised below the argument that
the forcible detainer statute only applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not personal
property. In any event, they clearly did raise this argument. [See, e.g., R. 401-402 ^|a, c & e;
175-176; 230-231; 305-306; R. 529 at 560-561; 403 \S\
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